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ABSTRACT 
The economics literature shows that tradable emissions permits 
have important theoretical advantages over source-specific technical 
standards as a means for controlling pollution. But efficient, 
competitive markets in emissions may also be difficult to implement: 
transactions may be few with high negotiation costs; the market may be 
highly concentrated. S imple workable versions of the market concept 
may fail to take account of important complexities in the relationship 
between the pattern of emissions and the geographical distribution of 
pollution. This paper examines the feasibility of tradable permits, 
given these potential problems. Although the empirical part of the 
paper deals with a specific case--particulate sulfates in the Los 
Angeles airshed--the methods developed for investigating these issues 
have general applicability. Moreover, the particular market design 
that is proposed--an auction process that involves no net revenue 
collection by the state--has attractive features as a general model. 
DESIGNING A MARKET FOR TRADABLE EMIS SIONS PERMITS
* 
Robert W. Hahn and Roger G, Noll 
California Institute of Technology 
Since the late 1970s, environmental regulators have begun to 
give serious attention to alternatives to source-specific technical 
standards as a means for controlling pollution. Indeed, a limited, 
highly constrained form of one such alternative--tradable emissions 
permits--began to be implemented for a few air pollutants in some 
regions. Less constrained methods for implementing tradable permits 
are actively under consideration; notable examples include the 
proposals being considered by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) for controlling chlorofluorocarbons and by the California Air 
Resources Board for reducing particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles 
air shed. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the practicality 
of a system of tradable emissions permits. The central issue is not 
whether a market for emissions permits will work perfectly, but 
whether it can produce a more efficient combination of emissions and 
abatement strategies than the traditional regulatory approach. This 
* 
The work reported here was supported by the California Air Resources 
Board, Glen Cass provided useful comments on an earlier draft, and 
Richard Hanson provided data management support. The authors are 
solely responsible for the contents of this paper, 
2 
question is examined in the context of a particular pollutant in a 
specific area, namely the control of sulfur oxides (SOX) emissions 
into the atmosphere in Los Angeles. Nevertheless, we believe the 
analysis to be of general interest, It raises questions that must be 
answered in order to make a tradable permits system a practical 
alternative anywhere. It also illustrates the range of institutional 
arrangements and informational requirements that need to be considered 
in developing a market for permits. 
The tradable permits system examined here is a more radical 
institutional change than has previously been adopted by regulatory 
authorities, The "controlled trading options" developed by EPA since 
the passage of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977�so-called 
bubbles, offsets and emissions banks--start with the existing 
regulatory structure as a baseline, and overlay it with the 
possibility of of trades.
1 
These trading options retain detailed 
regulatory reviews of each source and of proposed trades. Moreover, 
traded permits have a somewhat clouded, secondary legal status in 
comparison to untraded permits. 
The approach examined here replaces, rather than supplements, 
the regulatory methods that are now used to control emissions at their 
source, It would eliminate distinctions among sources on the basis of 
age, ownership, industry or method of acquiring permits. It would 
simply establish a ceiling on total emissions within a geographic 
area, and it would allow the allocation of emissions among sources in 
1 
See Hahn and Noll (1981) for a more complete discussion of 
this issue, 
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the area to be determined solely by the market. No regulatory 
approval of the methods used by any source nor of the distribution of 
emissions permits among the sources would be required. Policy issues 
relating to the differential air quality effects of different 
geographical distributions of emissions permits would be dealt with by 
the way in which trading regions were defined, and by the rules for 
trading across regional boundaries, as will be discussed below. The 
role of the government would be reduced to the following activities:2 
(1) establish ambient air quality standards; (2) determine the total 
amount of emissions in a geographic area that is consistent with the 
air quality standard; (3) issue permits and maintain a market for 
them; and (4) enforce the emissions limits by ascertaining whether 
each source is emitting pollutants at or below the rate allowed by the 
quantity of permits it holds, and by imposing noncompliance penalties. 
The scholarly literature3 has examined in detail the 
theoretical advantages and problems of a system of tradable emissions 
permits. A competitive market in enforceable emissions permits will 
achieve a given emissions target at minimum cost and will provide more 
effective incentives to pursue cost-reducing innovations in abatement 
technology--advantages that are also characteristic of emissions 
taxes. In addition, tradable permits have possible political 
2 Regulators also may wish to use direct regulation, rather than 
a tradable permits system, to deal with air pollution "episodes" 
that arise when meteorological conditions are unfavorable. See 
Hahn and Noll (1981) for a more complete discussion of this 
problem. 
3 Examples include Dales (1968), Montgomery (1972), Roberts and 
Spence (1976), and Teitenberg (1980). 
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advantages in comparison to emissions taxes in that they do not 
necessarily require that the government collect revenues for allowable 
emissions (the permits can be given away) , and they cause the 
uncertainties associated with environmental policy to be focused more 
on the total costs of the policy and less on the equilibrium quanti ty 
of emissions. Finally, in comparison to other methods of 
environmental regulation, a competitive permits market provides fewer 
barriers to entry for new or expanded pollution sources, and imposes 
less demanding requirements on regulators. 
A major question concerning the practicality of tradable 
emissions permits is whether a competitive market can be established. 
Ideally, a market in permits would have a large number of buyers and 
sellers who actively trade permits, quickly establish a market price 
for permits that is close to the long-run equilibrium, and take 
actions that minimize abatement costs and distribute emissions 
geographically and temporally such that ambient air quality standards 
are met. In practice, this ideal may not be feasible. 
One potential problem is the structure of the permits market. 
One or a few sources of pollution might account for such a high 
proportion of emissions that the permits market will be imperfectly 
competitive, leading to strategic market behavior by the major 
polluters that prevents the market from allocating permits in a manner 
that minimizes the total abatement costs. Even if the market is not 
concentrated, the number of participants may be too few to produce 
more than very infrequent transactions. This, in turn, could lead to 
costly bilateral negotiations for effecting trades. Moreover, 
5 
infrequent trades would produce infrequent and possibly highly 
variable price signals that undermine the ability of polluters to make 
efficient choices of levels and methods of abatement. These problems 
have already arisen in attempts to implement EPA's offset and banking 
policies. 
Another potential problem arises from the geographic 
specificity of both emissions and damages from pollution. Each 
receptor is polluted by a somewhat different combination of sources, 
the emissions from which interact--sometimes nonlinearly--to produce 
unique effects. To guarantee maximum technical efficiency, ignoring 
the costs of operating the markets, requires that a separate market be 
established for pollution at each receptor point. Each firm would 
have to know the relationship between its emission and pollution at 
every receptor. and then buy the appropriate amount of pollution 
permits for each one that it affects. Ignoring this feature of 
pollution problems and establishing a single permits market for an 
extensive geographic area could lead to a concentration of emissions 
from one location that, in turn, would create a localized "hot spot" 
which is badly out of compliance with ambient pollution standards. 
Alternatively, creating numerous markets that account for the 
complexities of the relationship between emissions and pollution could 
make the costs of organizing an effective market system so high that 
it is not worth doing. Moreover, a system with numerous interrelated 
markets may have some markets in which only one or a few polluters 
participate, leading to inefficiencies resulting from market 
concentration. 
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Whether these potential difficulties off set the theoretical 
advantages of a system of tradable permits is an empirical question, 
the answer to which depends on technical as pect s of the pollution 
problem that is being addressed and the details of the design of the 
permits market. Both potential problems--imperfect competition and 
localized pollution hot spots--arise because of a particular 
perversity in the cost-minimizing distribution of permits. Hence, to 
determine whether either problem is likely to be a serious drawback to 
a specific system of marketable permits requires analyzing the likely 
operation of the market to see if the hypothetical competitive 
equilibrium distribution of permits is vulnerable to these 
perversities. To undertake such an analysis requires two types of 
information: the abatement cost functions faced by each.important 
source of emissions in the region in question, and a model of the 
relationship between emissions and pollution that has sufficient 
geographical resolution that it can predict the effects of alternative 
patterns of emissions on the pattern of pollution within the area. 
The abatement cost functions provide the information necessary 
to determine the distribution of emissions permits for a specific 
market system. A pollution source that is operated in an economically 
rational way will minimize the sum of expenditures on permits and on 
abatement measures for any given level of operation. Higher permit 
prices generally will lead to fewer purchases of permits and greater 
abatement. Hence, knowledge of the abatement cost function for each 
source provides the information necessary to calculate the demand 
curve for permits for each source and, by addition, for the entire 
market. These demand relationships can then be used to estimate the 
market's allocation of permits among sources for any given total 
quantity of permits. This is accomplished by using the market demand 
curve to find the equilibrium price of the given quantity of permits, 
and then using each source-specific demand curve to estimate the 
equilibrium distribution of permits. The model of the relationship 
between emissions and pollution can then be used to predict the 
distribution of emissions that the market would produce. 
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Alternative designs of a system of tradable permits can be 
compared by simulating the operation of each. For example, the 
definition of the geographic scope of a market--which sources are 
required to buy which permits--is a design variable that can be used 
to find the best trade-off between problems of market structure and 
problems arising from pollution hot spots. As the geographic area in 
which permits can be freely traded grows more extensive, more sources 
are incorporated into the market and hence problems of market 
concentration and infrequent transactions are diminished; however, the 
likelihood of localized pollution hot spots is increased. 
IS IMPLEMENTATION FEASIBLE? 
To investigate the viability of marketable permits without 
actually implementing the alternative requires selecting a specific 
pollutant, identifying the key implementation problems, and then 
detennining whether a well-designed market will successfully address 
these issues. As an example, the problem of controlling particulate 
sulfates in the Los Angeles region was selected. This problem was 
chosen because its technical characteristics make it a likely 
candidate for marketable permits, as is discussed below. 
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The current approach towards controlling sulfur oxides 
emissions in Los Angeles relies on source-specific standards, an 
offset policy, and a modest emissions fee. Large new sources of 
pollution must adopt the best available technology, and must trade off 
the uncontrolled portion of their emissions by effecting further 
reductions at existing sources in the Los Angeles Basin. The owner of 
an existing source is thus vested with a valuable property right which 
can be sold in whole or in part to new sources. The owner also has 
the option of retaining the opportunity for further abatement to 
facilitate subsequent expansion, 
As discussed above, the offset policy is one limited form of a 
market in transferable permits to emit air pollutants. Its principal 
drawbacks are that the costs of negotiation are excessive, the number 
of trades which can be made by new sources is limited, all trades must 
be approved by several regulatory authorities before they can be 
consunnnated, and in any case, sources must satisfy minimum technical 
standards before and after trades. Negotiation costs are high because 
new entrants must first identify existing sources of pollution where 
emissions reductions are feasible, and then try to estimate a 
reasonable charge for the offset. Moreover, gains from trade are 
limited to the extent that existing technical standards do not allow 
marginal abatement costs to be equated across firms. 
The question at hand is whether a market for sulfur oxides 
emissions permits could improve matters. First, the criteria for 
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measuring the success of a market proposal need to be specified. For 
this specific case a marke t should satisfy established air quality 
goals for sulfate particulates in a more cost-effective manner than 
the current system of source-specific standards, should encourage 
investmen t in finding more cost-effective abatement technologies for 
the future, and should be legally and politically feasible. Legal 
feasibility means that the market must mee t the requirements of 
relevant constitutional constraints, and be implementable without 
fundamental changes in the performance objectives of existing 
statutes, Political feasibility means that the regulatory agency 
should be capable of administering the program, and tha t the approach 
has a reasonable chance of being sufficiently acceptable to industry, 
the public and regulators tha t it stands a chance of being enacted by 
public officials. 
To demon19trate feasibility requires a good technical 
understanding of the problem. The particulate sulfate problem in Los 
Angeles is caused primarily by the combustion of sulfur-bearing energy 
sources. Particulate sulfates are a regulatory concern because they 
reduce visibility, acidify rainwater, and may have harmful health 
effects. The conversion of sulfur oxides emissions to sulfates in Los 
Angeles can be thought of as proceeding in three stages. First, 
sulfur enters the air basin. Virtually all of the sulfur which is 
emitted in Los Angeles is initially embodied in crude oil. Second, 
when oil products are refined or burned without controls, some of the 
sulfur they contain is converted to so2 and so3 and released to the
atmosphere. Finally, the SOX compounds react to form sulfates through
a series of atmospheric chemical processes. 
Cass (1978) has succeeded in constructing an emissions/air 
quality model for particulate sulfates in Los Angeles. He has shown 
that the relation be tween sulfur oxides emissions and sulfate air 
quali ty in Los Angeles is approximately linear and, in addition, can 
be modeled adequately as if it were largely independent of the level 
of other key pollutants. One feature of Cass's model is tha t mobile 
sources are treated as stationary sources by converting them to 
traffic densities over the airshed. Because the most efficient 
strategy for reducing sulfur emissions from mobile sources is to 
reduce the sulfur content of fuels, regulation of mobile sources can 
be done indirectly by placing the responsibility on refiners. A 
tradable permits system could then require refiners to add refinery 
emissions to sulfur oxides emissions from mobile sources to de termine 
the number of permits they must hold, 
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A major task of the project was to estimate abatement cost 
functions for the primary sources of sulfur emissions in Los Angeles, 
Over twenty-five source categories were identified, and abatement 
costs estimated for each. The published literature, regulatory 
proceedings, and interviews with representatives of local industry and 
state and local regulatory personnel were relied upon to generate 
preliminary cost estimates. The information typically obtained from a 
particular source was a poin t estima te: the cost at some historical 
date of using a particular method to obtain a specific rate of 
emissions from a particular kind of facility. These were combined to 
produce a step function for abatement costs for representative 
facilities in each source ca tegory based on 1977 regulatory 
conditions, with corrections made to put the costs in 1977 dollars, 
The results of these analyses were submitted as industry studies to 
the relevant firms operating in Los Angeles, with requests for 
comments. The additional data received in this manner were used to 
produce a final cost study, including indications of the amount of 
disagreement about costs among the sources of information. 
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A number of factors make these cos t estimates upwardly biased 
as estimators of the costs tha t would be experienced if a sys tem of 
tradable permits were instituted. First, for source categories for 
which no con trol cost estimates could be found, emissions were assumed 
to be uncontrollable. Second, production and energy use at emitting 
facilities were assumed to be independent of the amount of con trol, 
In reality, firms with especially high emissions and s tiff abatement 
costs are likely to reduce output or to make more efficient use of 
energy. Third, although in many cases emissions can be reduced by 
process changes, firms are reluctant to reveal these possibilities 
because they are trade secrets that may confer significan t competitive 
advantages in a more s tringen t regulatory environment. No allowance 
for these process changes is made in the study, although an effort is 
now being made to model the possibili ty of changes in refinery product 
mix in the oil industry as one means of changing emissions from 
refineries and refined products. 
Because SOX emissions in Los Angeles result largely from the 
combustion of petroleum products, the availability of natural gas, 
which has negligible amoun ts of sulfur, can significantly affect Sox 
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emissions. This, in turn, will affect the demand for permits and, 
hence, their price, Price regulation has led to excess demand for 
natural gas since the mid-1960s, and to uncertainties about the 
availability of gas in the future, even though gas is now scheduled to 
be deregula ted, For this reason, three separate cases were analyzed: 
one which assumes low availability of natural gas; a second which 
corresponds to a historical supply year (1973) in which an 
intermediate supply of gas was available; and a third which assumes a 
high supply of natural gas. All three cases are based on emissions 
projections for the early 1980s with 1977 regulations assumed to be in 
place, In all cases, access to natural gas is assumed to be 
determined by regulatory allocation priorities, rather than the 
market. This has an important effect on the results because 
regulatory alloca tion priorities are not related to the value of 
natural gas in terms of either its direct use or the effects of its 
use on air quality. 
With these caveats in mind, the cost data were used to 
estimate the demand for emissions permits and the dis tribution of 
permits that an efficien t marke t would produce. 
THE COMPETITIVE MODEL 
In all of the models discussed, it is assumed that firms 
attempt to minimize the sum of abatements costs plus permit costs, In 
this section, a baseline competi tive equilibrium distribution of 
emissions permits is simula ted. Firms are assumed to be price-takers, 
which is to say they assume that the equilibrium price of a permit is 
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unaffected by their actions. A permit is defined as the right to emit 
one ton so2 equivalent of sulfur oxides per day anywhere in the 
airshed. After examining this baseline case, it will be compared to a 
fine-tuned definition of permits that takes account of the 
geographical locations of sources and receptors, and to a simulated 
distribution of emissions when the permits are monopsonized. 
To simulate the market, it is necessary to specify an air 
quality target. For the purposes of analysis, four targets are 
examined, ranging from no further net emission control down to about a 
70 percent reduction in emissions. The latter is needed to meet the 
California sulfate standard. The four cases are summarized in Table 1. 
The calculations in the table are based on a linear rollback 
model of the relationship between emissions and sulfate pollution. 
The estimates of the emissions/air quality relationship would probably 
change if a more sophisticated air pollution model were employed, but 
the rollback model suffices for the purpose of showing how the permit 
price and abatement costs vary with the choice of an air quality 
target. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium price of a permit to 
emit one ton/day of SOX in Los Angeles for the case in which there is 
a low natural gas supply. All price and cost estimates are given in 
1977 dollars. 
The decreasing step function in Figure 1 represents the 
derived demand curve for permits over the range of interest. The 
curve was drawn as a step function because most of the engineering 
cost estimates which were used to generate the demand curves were 
given in this form. The four vertical supply constraints in Figure 1 
TABLE 1 
SELECTED AIR QUALITY TARGETS FOR THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN 
in tons SOx/day
a 
TARGET 
1. Achieve California Sulfate Air Quality Standard 
of 25 micrograms/cubic meter over a 24 hour 
averaging time.
2. Violate California Sulfate Air Quality Standard 
3-5% of the time.
3. No additional controls with an above average 
natural gas supply.
4. No additional controls with a low natural gas
supply.
ALLOWABLE 
EMISSIONS 
149 
238 
335 
421 
aSee Hahn (198lb) for the basis of these calculations. Sulfur 
oxides emissions are measured as tons of so2 equivalent. 
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correspond to the four air quality targets presented in Table I. The 
market price of a permit is drawn next to each intersection. Thus, 
for the first case in which the California sulfate standard is met, 
the point estimate for the price of a permit is 4,590 dollars. Based 
on the derived demand for permits, it is also possible to calculate 
two other potentially interesting numbers. The amount of money which 
could conceivably change hands in a permit market can be calculated by 
multiplying the number of permits issued by the equilibrium price. 
The annual abatement cost for any level of air quality can be computed 
by integrating the area under the entire demand curve and to the right 
of the air quality target, and then multiplying by 365. (Because 
Figure 1 only shows the main part of the curve, and not the curve in 
its entirety, it is not possible to reconstruct abatement cost numbers 
from the figure.) The significance of these numbers is discussed 
below. 
The price of an emissions permit is highly sensitive to the 
availability of natural gas and to the choice of an air quality 
target. Table 2 shows the equilibrium price of a permit with 
alternative assumptions about air quality standards and the 
availability of natural gas, Table 2 exhibits two interesting
features. First, it can be seen that the price of a permit can vary 
by an order of magnitude depending on the assumptions concerning 
natural gas supply and the air quality target, Second, a comparison 
of the first two columns indicates that a fairly small change in air 
quality standards cause a substantial change in the price of a permit. 
This reflects the fact that the marginal cost of sulfur oxides 
abatement changes at the upper end of the air quality spectrum. 
TABLE 2 
PRICE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
NATURAL 
GAS SUPPLY 
Low 
Historical 
High 
1 
4,590a 
2,720 
1, 320 
AIR QUALITY TARGET 
2 3 
2, 720 2, 000 
2,000 940 
650 470 
aAll prices in$ 1977. A permit entitles the user to emit
one ton of SOx for one day.
Source: Hahn (198la) 
4 
940 
810 
420 
17 18 
The total annual cost of abatement varies considerably both as 
a function of the natural gas supply and the air quality target. The 
data are presented in Table 3. The estimates of abatement cost do not 
include abatement equipment installed prior to 1977. Consequently, 
the changes in abatement cost between different categories are 
probably the most meaningful figures. Even without estimates of some 
abatement equipment in place, abatement costs are in the hundreds of 
millions, except for the case in which natural gas is in plentiful 
supply. 
The most important point to be derived from Table 3 is that 
the availability of natural gas has a marked effect on the cost of 
reducing SOX emissions. The only difference between the situations of
low and high natural gas supply is that the latter substitutes natural 
gas for 100 million barrels of residual fuel oil. Dividing the 
difference in abatement costs between the two cases by the difference 
in the amount of oil used yields an average cost saving per barrel-
equivalent of natural gas between 4 and 6 dollars, depending on the 
air quality target. The cost savings result from the substitution of 
natural gas for high-sulfur fuel oil, rather than using low-sulfur oil 
or extensive abatement investments to meet emissions targets. 
Another way of illustrating the critical importance of the 
natural gas supply is to ask what firms would be willing to pay for 
having natural gas substituted for one barrel of residual fuel oil. 
Assume that the marginal value of natural gas equals the full marginal 
cost of burning residual fuel oil. The full cost includ�s the price 
of a barrel of oil plus the cost of emitting or abating the associated 
NATURAL 
GAS SUPPLY 
Low 
Historical 
High 
Source: Hahn (198la ) 
TABLE 3 
ANNUJ\L ABATEMENT COSTS 
(in millions of 1977 dollars ) 
AIR QUJ\LITY TARGET 
l 2 3 
684 576 487 
400 315 280 
112 83 66 
4 
447 
252 
53 
19 20 
sulfur oxides. Performing the calculation for all twelve cases 
reveals that firms would be willing to pay anywhere from 107 percent 
to 130 percent of the price of the residual fuel oil for an equivalent 
BTU amount of natural gas. 
In evaluating the desirability of a system of marketable 
permits, one important issue is the potential savings in the costs of 
regulation. Of course, most of the opportunities for cost savings are 
not easily quantified. For example, a system of tradable emission 
permits will tend to produce lower barriers to entry than the current 
emission standards approach; however, placing a meaningful dollar 
estimate on the expected net benefits from such a change is difficult, 
It is also difficult to know to what extent the marketable permit 
system will induce innovations in abatement technology over time. 
Finally, the costs of the regulatory process should be lower under 
tradable permits, but the magnitude of the savings is uncertain, The 
following analysis focuses solely on the static efficiency gains which 
can accrue from using a market mechanism. Moreover, attention will be 
restricted to that subset of static gains not involving process 
changes, which could be substantial for industries such as petroleum 
refiners. Thus, the estimates developed here are best viewed as a 
lower bound on the actual gains that might result from moving to 
marketable permits. 
For SOx emissions in Los Angeles, the gains from using an
incentive-based approach to maintain the status quo can be expected to 
be relatively small in comparison to other applications which have 
been examined. This is because the local pollution control agency has 
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attempted to use cost-effectiveness as a major criterion in 
promulgating rules. 
The specific problem is to examine how the competitive 
equilibrium under a tradable emissions permit system compares with the 
current standards approach to regulation. The first step in the 
analysis is to project the level of expected emissions under 
standards. This calculation is performed for all three levels of 
natural gas supply, and two sets of standards. The first set of 
standards consists of those in place by the end of 1977. The second 
set consists of those expected to be in place by 1985. The projected 
emissions for the six cases are shown in Table 4. Note that the 
projected emissions for the low natural gas scenario under 1977 
standards correspond to case 4 in Table 1. The predicted emissions in 
1985 are lower than 1977 sulfur oxides emissions because the former 
standards include more stringent controls on three source categories: 
petroleum coke calciners, fluid catalytic crackers and residual fuel 
burning by refiners. 
The next step in the analysis is to compare the cost of 
standards with the competitive equilibrium for an emissions permit 
market. The difference is the expected annual savings in moving from 
standards to tradable emissions permits, which is shown in Table 5. 
The data show that some cost savings are possible, even though 
regulators have tried to implement cost-effective control strategies. 
The last point which the analysis of the competitive case 
raises is the magnitude of the sums of money which could conceivably
change hands if a market were to be implemented in a way that caused 
NATURAL GAS 
Low 
Historical 
High 
TABLE 4 
SULFUR OXIDES EMISSIONS UNDER STANDARDS 
(Tons SOx/Day)
S TANDARDS 
1977 1985 
421 364 
298 250 
211 167 
Source: Hahn (198la) 
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TABLE 5 
ANNUAL COSTS SAVINGS 
WITH AN UNDI FFERENTIATED TRADABLE PERM IT SYSTEM
(in millions of 1977 dollars) 
NATURAL GAS STANDARDS 
Low 
Historical 
High 
Source: Hahn (198la) 
1977 1985 
23 22 
17 15 
10 8 
D M 
all permits to be sold, such as a public auction. Define the total 
annualized value of the permits as the number issued multiplied by the 
annual price people are willing to pay to hold a permit for one year, 
(This price is obtained by multiplying the data in Table 2 by 365.) 
For the twelve cases examined here, the total annual value of the 
permits varies between 65 and 250 million dollars, and is generally 
only slightly smaller than the corresponding annualized abatement 
costs. This may have considerable political significance. The 
initial allocation of permits, establishing the baseline from which 
trades are made, is an implicit allocation of a considerable amount of 
wealth�indeed, the magnitude of the wealth inherent in the permits is 
likely to be large in comparison to the efficiency gains from a 
permits market, Consequently, the principal focus of the political 
debate over alternative market designs is likely to be wealth 
distribution, not efficiency. 
The preceding analysis deals with the case in which emissions 
permits are freely tradable throughout the airshed, with no account 
taken of the differences among sources in the impact of cmissions on 
ambient air quality. In practice, a fine-tuned permits market would 
be difficult to implement; however, the outcome of such a system, 
assuming it could be implemented, can be simulated in the same fashion 
as the case of a competitive market for geographically unspecified 
permits. This is the subject of the next section. 
DOES FINE-TUNING PAY? 
Instead of having a single market where permits are 
undifferentiated, imagine a case where there are several markets 
corresponding to each of the receptors within an air quality region. 
Assume further that firms would have to participate in all markets 
where their individual emissions affect air quality. This is the 
essence of the "fine-tuning" problem. In practice, a fine-tuned 
permits market would be difficult to implement; however, the outcome 
of such a system, assuming it could be implemented, can be simulated 
in the same fashion as the case of a competitive market for 
geographically unspecified permits. 
The results of the simulations for this case are shown in 
Table 6. Column (1) lists six alternative levels of total emissions 
to be allowed in the airshed. Column (2) shows the abatement costs 
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for achieving these levels, assuming a competitive permits market and 
low availability of natural gas, The low natural gas case was 
selected because it generates the highest abatement costs and, 
therefore, is likely to produce the maximal benefits from fine-tuning. 
Associated with the competitive distribution of each of the 
emissions levels in Column (1) is a set of the average concentrations 
of sulfate particulates during the year at each of the seventeen air 
quality monitoring sites used in the simulation. Suppose that instead 
of setting a limit on total emissions, regulators issue permits to 
pollute at each receptor point equal to the pollution that would 
result from the competitive equilibrium in the emissions permit 
market. Each source of emissions would then need to acquire 
TABLE 6 
ANNUAL ABATEMENT COSTS AND MARKET ARRANGEMENTS 
(1) 
BASELINE 
EMISSIONS 
TARGET 
(TONS/DAY 
so2 EQUIV)
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
(2) 
AVERAGE 
AIR 
QUALITJ 
( gm/m ) 
7. 0 
7.8 
8,4 
8.9 
10 .1 
11.1 
(3) (4) 
COSTS FOR COSTS FOR 
SINGLE MARKET EQUIVALENT 
IN EMISSIONS MULTIPLE 
PERMITS AIR QUALITY 
MARKETS 
682 682 
614 606 
565 557 
515 513 
476 473 
455 448 
Note: Assumes "low" natural gas availability. 
Source: Hahn (198la) 
(5) 
COSTS FOR 
"ADJUSTED" 
MULTIPLE 
AIR QUALITY 
MARKETS 
682 
594 
545 
505 
464 
436 
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separately permits for the pollution its emissions caused at every 
measuring station. Because geographical location matters in affecting 
measured air pollution, this approach could produce additional 
rearrangements of emissions -- and some increase in total emissions 
that resulted in lower abatement costs but did not reduce air quality 
at any measuring station. Column (3) shows the costs associated with 
the competitive equilibrium distribution of emissions under this 
system. 
Finally, suppose regulators are concerned only with air 
quality at the worst measuring station, and that they create permits 
for each station that allow pollution at every monitoring station to 
equal the pollution measured at the worst station under the 
competitive equilibrium distribution of emissions permits in Column 
(1). This would allow further trades and increases in emissions as 
long as air quality did not deteriorate at the location with the worst 
pollution, and did not force some other station to have its air 
quality deteriorate beyond the level at the worst-case station. The 
abatement costs associated with the competitive equilibrium 
distribution of these permits is shown in Column (4) . 
The result of these simulations is that defining permits in 
terms of pollution, and geographically differentiating the permits for 
each monitoring location, has relatively little effect on the 
efficiency of the market. The differences in annual abatement costs 
under the three systems vary from zero to four percent of the total, 
amounts that are surely small compared to the difficulties of trying 
to implement a more complicated system. 
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There are two qualifications to the basic result that a 
finely-tuned system may not be warranted on the basis of cost savings. 
First, it should be noted that air quality is measured in terms of 
average annual concentrations. A shorter averaging time could produce 
a different result. Second, the result speaks to the present. 
Calculations are based upon the abatement possibilities and emissions 
inventories of existing firms in their current locations. Changes in 
the economic structure of the airshed conceivably could alter the 
pattern of emissions such that a more complicated system would provide 
substantial benefits. But at present, there does not appear to be a 
serious loss in efficiency associated with adopting the simplest 
approach of making emissions permits freely transferable throughout 
the airshed. 
THE EFFECTS OF MARKET POWER 
Thus far, the analysis has been restricted to the case in 
which firms act as price-takers in the permits market. One potential 
problem with a marketable permits system is that one or a few firms 
may be able to manipulate the market to their advantage and, in the 
extreme, destroy its efficiency advantages over standards, This 
problem cannot be dismissed lightly for the case at hand. 
The source producing the highest rate of emissions is an 
electric utility. Table 7 shows the estimated share of total 
emissions that it would produce under the competitive market 
allocation, which ranges between one-fourth to one-half of the 
permits. Whether this will, in fact, allow the firm to exercise 
TABLE 7 
MARKET SHARE OF THE LARGEST PERMIT HOLDER UNDER COMPETITION 
NATURAL 
GAS SUPPLY 
Low 
Historical 
High 
Source: Hahn (198la) 
1 
31 
32 
23 
AIR QUALITY TARGET 
2 3 4 
43 45 41 
43 48 48 
29 40 47 
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significant market power is an open question that depends on how the 
market is organized and operates. For purposes of analysis, we will 
assume that this sizable market share allows the firm to exercise 
market power. 
The market power of the firm with the largest market share 
could manifest itself in several ways. It is not even clear without 
further specification of the details of the design of the market 
whether a firm with market power will act as a monopolistic seller of 
permits or as a monopsonistic buyer. 4 Here we will analyze the case
of a monopsonistic buyer. We assume that the firm in question 
initially will be given fewer permits than it is expected to want to 
hold after the market in permits is opened. This is consistent with 
present policies that tend to require utilities to adopt abatement 
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methods having higher marginal abatement cost than is common for most 
other industries. For the numerical simulation discussed below, we 
assume that the utility will receive no permits initially, and that it 
will be the only purchaser of permits--that is, the initial 
distribution of permits is such that the utility will be able to 
exercise maximal market power. In such a market, the equilibrium 
price will equal the marginal abatement cost of the sellers of 
permits, but not of the monopsonistic buyer. In purchasing permits, 
the monopsonist will take account of the fact that as it increases its 
purchases of permits, it will drive up their price. Hence, it will 
buy fewer permits at a lower price than would be the competitive, 
4 For an analysis of this problem, see Hahn (198la) . 
cost-minimizing solution. In other words, the monopsonist will abate 
too much in relation to other firms, and the latter will have lower 
marginal abatement costs than the former. To the monopsonist, some 
additional, uneconomic abatement will be worthwhile because of its 
depressing effect on the price paid for the permits that it acquires 
from other firms. 
Table 8 i>hows the simulated market share of the firm holding 
the most permits, assuming that it achieves the prof it-maximizing 
monopsony. A comparison of Tables 7 and 8 illustrates the additional 
abatement that the monopsonist will undertake if it has market power. 
The two tables also reveal one other interesting fact. The market 
share of the largest firm tends to be high at an intermediate natural 
gas supply and does not differ much between high and low gas supply. 
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This reflects the fact that at the extremes natural gas is either used 
sparingly or extensively by almost all industrial sources, while the 
intermediate case reflects the fact that utilities will be among the 
last to be allowed to switch to gas from low-sulfur fuel oil under the 
current scheme for gas allocations. 
The decrease in market share is typically accompanied by a 
decrease in the price of a permit. This can be seen by comparing 
Table 9 with Table 2. As in the competitive case, the permit price 
still varies by an order of magnitude over different assumptions about 
the air quality target and the supply of natural gas. 
Although the differences between the competitive and 
monopsonistic case appear large, whether they cause a major loss of 
efficiency in achieving abatement targets remains an open question. 
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TABLE 8 
MARKET SHARE OF THE LARGEST PERMIT HOLDER UNDER MARKET POWER 
NATURAL 
GAS SUPPLY AIR QUALITY TARGET 
1 2 3 4 
Low 20 31 37 41 
Historical 32 40 33 44 
High 23 25 39 32 
Source: Hahn (198la) 
TABLE 9 
PERMIT PRICES UNDER MARKET POWER 
NATURAL 
GAS SUPPLY AIR QUAL ITY TARGET 
l 2 3 
Low 2 , 7 20 a 2 , 0 0 0  1 , 0 0 0  
Hi stori cal 2 , 7 2 0  1 , 000 6 50 
High 1 , 0 0 0  47 0 420 
aAll pr i ces are in$ 197 7. A permit ent i t l es the user to
emi t one ton of sox per day . 
S our ce: Hahn ( 198la ) 
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4 
940 
47 0 
210 
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The appro priate mea s ure of inef f i c iency i s  nei ther price nor market 
share, but the d i f f er ences in t o t a l  aba tement co s t s  under the two 
si t uation s .  I f  a t  the competi t ive eq uilibrium all f i rms face a f air ly 
f l at marg ina l  abatement co s t  over a w ide r ange of emi s s i ons 
reduction s , a l arge shif t of em i s sions from the mono p soni s t  t o  the 
rest of the f irms might ent a i l  rel atively l i t t l e  l o s s  of e f f i c i ency. 
As can be seen in Figur e  1 ,  a l l  of the choi ces of al ter na t iv e  ambient 
air q ua l i ty st andards happen t o  f a l l  within rel a t ively flat por t ions 
of the demand curve f or permi t s ,  and theref or e in area s in which the 
aba t ement co s t  f un c t i on obey s es s ent ially constant marg inal cos t s ,  
Calcula tions o f  the eff i c i ency lo s s  o f  market power were mad e  i n  each 
case,  and the l o s s  was de termined to be r e l a t ively sma l l ,  rang ing from 
z ero to ten per cent depending upon the par t i c u l ar combina tion of 
a s s umpt ions about na tur a l  gas supplies , amb ient a i r  quality s tandards , 
and the method used for e s t ima t ing the aba tement co s t  f unc tions. 
Never th e l es s ,  a conc l u s i on that market power w il l  no t severely 
undermine the oper a tion of the market is no t warranted a t  thi s  time. 
The est imated l o s s  in e f f i c i ency due to marke t power is qui te 
sen s i t ive t o  smal l  changes in the co s t  f unc tion s .  Con s eq uently , 
consider ab l e  though t mus t  be g iv en to the po s s ib i l i ty of bui l d ing in 
pro tec tions again s t  monopsoni s t i c  marke t power into the tradable 
perm i t s  s y s t em .  These i s s ues are addres sed i n  the f o l low ing sect ion 
which focuses on q ue s t ions of in s t i t utional de s ign. 
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IN ITIAL IZ ING THE MARKET 
The maj or design cri ter i a  for a tradab l e  emi s s ions permit 
market are: eq ui ty in the d i s tribution of permi t s  ini t i a l ly; 
suf f ic ient early tran s a c t i on s  t o  produce a stable pr ice for permi t s  
tha t i s  clo se t o  t h e  long-run equilibrium t o  encourage ra tional long­
term investment pl anning ; and a t tainment of an equi l ibr ium pr i ce and 
d i s tribution of permit s  tha t  is c lo se enough to the compe t i t ive ca se 
to a s s ur e  a t t ainment of air qua l i ty obj ec t i ves at l ower co s t s  th an can 
be o b t ained by al terna t ive regulat ory approa ches. A maj or design 
f ea t ure tha t  affec t s  the extent t o  which a perm i t s  market s a t i s f ies 
these cri teria i s  the metho d f or s t a r t ing up the market . 
One way of s t a r t ing the market i s  to make an ini tial 
a l lo ca t ion of permi t s , and then t o  rely on the i nef f i c iencies of this 
a l lo c a t i on t o  gener ate incen t ives f or a market t o  f orm. Three methods 
f or ini t i a l ly d i s tributing the permi t s  are consi dered. One would base 
perm i t  d i s t r ibu t i on on emi s s i ons a s  they exi s t ed pr ior to recent 
a t tempt s  to contr o l  them ,  wi th perhaps s ome add i t io nal provi sion for 
f irms that have entered the air shed or expanded capa c i ty since that 
t ime . The second would base the ini t ial a l lo c a t ion on the emi s s ions 
al l owed under current s t andards. The third would ba se the 
d i s tribution of permi t s  o n  the projec ted eq uilibrium tha t wo ul d resul t 
f rom a competi tive, per f ec t ly ef f i c ient market in permi t s . Any o ther 
method tha t is based upon historical emi s s ions perf o rmance r a i ses the 
objec t ion that people who wer e  ear ly to comp ly with regulat ion would
be p uni shed f or cooper a t ing .  Any metho d tha t i s  not based on 
emi s s ions rai ses the obj ec t ion that it is arb i tr ary , and in any ca se 
is more vulnerable to becoming bogged d own in a conte s t  between 
competing c l aims f or red i s t r ibut i ng wea l th tha t  have nothing t o  do 
w i t h  air p o l l ution pol i c y .  
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Bas ing the ini tial d i s t r ibution on the proj ected compet i t i ve 
eq uilibrium ha s a serious defec t in terms of eff i ciency of the permi t s  
market. To the extent that the ini tial d i s t r ibut ion succeeded in 
f inding the compe t i t ive equil ibrium ,  it wou l d  a l s o  succeed in avoiding 
the neces s i ty for any transa c t i on s  among present sour ces . Only in the 
case of new sour ces or expans ions of exi s ting f a c i l i t ies wou l d  a 
demand for tr ades ari se. Thus , a rel a t i vely s peedy at tainment of a 
s tab l e ,  compe t i t ive price f or permi t s  would be l ea s t  l i kely under thi s 
mechani sm. Indeed , much the same prob l em s  as confront the current 
banking and off set po l i c ies could be expec ted: a s l ow  develo pment of 
the market owing t o  the d i f f icul ties of f inding tr ading par tner s and 
neg o t i a t ing a price. 
A second dif f icul ty with the strategy of d i s t r ibut ing the 
permi t s  o n  the ba s i s  of the estima ted compe t i t ive eq uilibrium i s  tha t 
i t  may be mor e vulner ab l e  to l egal chal lenges and del ay s .  The method 
f or s imul a t ing the c ompe t i t ive equil ibrium is t o  minimize es t ima ted 
aba tement co s t s  f or the ent i r e  air shed , a c a l culation that is ba sed on 
numerous estima te s  of co s t s  for each ca teg ory of sour ces at a l l  
f ea si b l e  l evel s of aba tement . Thi s  i s  tantamount t o  sett ing new 
sour c e- s pec i f i c  s tandards f or the entire reg i o n .  Because the co s t  
est imates o n  which the equi l ibrium al locat ion would b e  ba sed are 
admi t ted ly inexa c t ,  they are vulnerable to ch a l lenge as being 
insuf f iciently prec i se to s uppor t a regulatory dec i s ion, j us t  a s  
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exi s t ing sour c e- s pe c if i c  s tandards a r e  of t e n  cha l l enged�and changed 
or de l ay ed�on the ba s i s  of the i r  e s t imated c o sts and e f f e c t iv ene s s. 
If any sing l e  e s timate of co s t s  or eff i c i ency abatement tha t  was used 
in s imul ating the compe t i tiv e equi l ibrium was s ucc e s s f ul ly chal l eng e d , 
it would undermine the enti r e  ini t ia l  a l location of permits , and , 
henc e , the impl ementation of the sy stem .  
Other po s s ib l e  c andida t e s  f or permit d i s tribution a r e  t o  ba s e  
ini tial a l l o ca t i ons on a n  h i s t or i c a l  lev e l  of emis s i on s  or curr ent 
s tandard s .  One po s s ib i l i ty of the f ormer is the emi s s ion s inventory 
of 1973, whi l e  an e s timat e  of the l a t ter i s  a proj ection of the 1980 
inventory . Both are shown in Tab l e  10. The s e ,  too , have unf ortunate 
proper t i e s . They appear to s t ack the deck in f avor of monopsonistic 
behavior by the f i rm with the l arge s t  share of p ermits . In 1973 and 
1980, thi s f i rm  accounted f or 2 8 and 31 per cent of em i s s i on s , 
r e s pe c t iv e ly , as contra s ted w i th a proj e c t io n  of 44 per cent under 
compe t i tion,  a s s um ing curr ent r egulat ions and h i stor ical natur al g a s  
availab i l i t y .  Thus , o n e  would expe ct th e l ar g e s t  f i rm  t o  b e  a 
pur chaser of permit s--and a very large pur chaser if the competi tive 
outcome is to b e  a chi eved . In ei ther ca s e ,  it i s  plausible that in
order to achieve the comp e t i tiv e r e s u l t ,  the f irm with the l arge s t  
marke t shar e mus t  a ccount f or near ly a l l  p ur cha s e s  of permi t s  ( near ly 
everyone e l s e  would be a se l ler ) ,  and ther efore f ac e  powerful 
incent iv e s  t o  engage in mono p soni s t i c  p ur cha s ing practi c e s. 
The d i l emma in organiz ing th e permits marke t i s  that ther e i s  
a seeming incon s i s tency i n  ge tting the s ing l e  l argest so ur c e  o f  
em i s s i ons t o  engage i n  tr ansactions so a s  t o  g e t  the market started 
TABLE 10 
PAST AND PROJE CTED "MARKET SHARE S "  OF SULFUR OXIDES EMI S S IONS 
BY S OURCE TYPE FOR THE S OUTH COAST AIR BASIN OF CAL IFORNIA1 
1980 Proj e c t ion 
1 9 7 3  Emi s s ions Low Natural Gas S c enar i o  
Source I % of T o t a l 2 Source % o f  TotalTvo e I Emi s s ions T e Emi s s ions 
I 
Ut i l i t y  28 I Ut i l i t y 3 1  
Mob i l e  Sources 1 6  Mob i l e  Sources 2 7  
Ut i l i ty 1 1  U t i l i t y  1 0  
O i l  C ompany 8 O i l  Company 4 
S t e e l  Comp any 7 Coke Calc ining C ompany 4 
O i l  C ompany 3 O i l  Company 4 
Coke Cal c in ing Company 3 S t e e l  Company 3 
O i l  Company 3 I O i l  Company 3 
I 
O i l  Company 2 I O i l  Company 2 
I 
O i l  Company 2 I O i l  Comp any 2 
1 Th e s e  f i g u r e s  are b a s e d  on the 19 74  d e f init ion of the South 
Coas t Air Basin wh i c h  was s ub s e quent ly revi s e d . 
2 Emi s s ions are round ed to the near e s t p e r cent . 
Source : C a l c u l a t ions by R . Hahn b a s e d  on C a s s  ( 19 7 8 )  and data 
used t o  c omp ile Ca s s ( 19 79 ) . 
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quick ly on a cour se that provides s tab le price s igna l s  to f i rms making 
aba tement and locat ion dec i s i ons , and in preventing the market from 
being manipula ted. Several po s s i b i l i ties emerge f or a t tacking this 
prob l em .  
One approach i s  t o  use d i f f erent methods f or the l argest 
emi s s ion s sour ce and o ther sources for making the ini t ial d i s tribution 
of perm i t s , a l loca t ing t o  the po tent i a l  mono p soni s t  something l ike the 
c ompet i t ive equ i l ibrium e s t ima t e  while us ing the hi s t or i c a l  ba s i s  f or 
a l locating permi t s  to o ther s .  Thi s  would probab ly produce a s i tua t i on 
in which the l argest sour c e  wa s no t a par t i c ipant in the ear ly s t ages 
of the market ; however the remaining sour ces would have an incentive 
t o  engage in trade s , and would be more l i kely to produce a compet i t ive 
out come. 
A second approach is to make a d i s t inction be tween the mo s t  
important sour ces a s  a group and the remaining sources , a l l o c a t ing 
perm i t s  initial ly so tha t  a l l of the former are eq ua l ly interested in 
acquiring more permit s ,  while a l l  of the l a t ter want to sel l .  Thus , 
each of the hal f-·do z en mo s t  impor tant sour ces of emi s s ions could be 
a l lo c a ted a number of emi s s ions permit s  tha t f a l l s  shor t of the 
est imated competi tive eq ui l ibrium by the same ab s o l ute amount , whi le 
the o ther f i rms could be g iven permi t s  tha t exceeded their e s t ima ted 
equi l ibrium amount by some propo r t i on that is con s i s t ent w i th the 
f ir s t  a l l o c a t ion . In s uch a s i t ua t i o n ,  the l argest source of 
emi s s ions would h o l d  the l argest number of permi t s , but would no t 
account for an es: pec ial ly l arge fraction of the transactions on i t s  
side o f  the market .  
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A third approach is to a l l o ca te o n ly s ome frac tion of the 
perm i t s  on the b a s i s  of h i s t or i c a l  or proj ected emis s ions , and let the 
s tate auction the res t .  Al l f i rms coul d ,  say,  be a l l o ca ted 80 or 90 
per cent of thei r proj ected equi l ibr i um  emi s s ions , and the r emaining 
permi t s  would be s o l d , Thi s  has the obj ection tha t ,  l i ke an emi s s ions 
tax , the s t a te ends up c o l lect ing revenues , so that the co s t s  of the 
sy s t em  to po l l uter s  exceed their aba t ement co s t s ; however if the 
fract ion of permits s o l d  wer e  sma l l  enough , the ef f ic iency gains to 
indu s t ry in rationa l iz ing abatement control s tra teg ies would off set 
the revenues l o s t  to the auc t ion .  
A f ina l po s s i b l e  approach i s  t o  use a n  auc t ion pro ces s that 
red i s tributes auction revenues t o  the f i rms tha t par t i cipa te in the 
market . In order to produce an ef f i c ient out come, the method for 
determining the reba te t o  a f i rm mus t  not depend o n  its a c tions in the 
auc t i on. One po s s ib l e  auc t i on pro ces s that generates no net revenue 
and tha t has a t tr a c t ive incent ive proper ties i s  a s  f o l l ow s . Each f i rm  
would receive a prov i s i ona l ini tial al location,  ba sed upon one of the 
cri teria d i s cus sed above ( hi s t orical emi s s ions , c urrent s t andar d s , 
expec ted competi tive equi l ibrium) .  Al l sources would be requi red t o  
offer their entire al l o c a t io n  f o r  sale. Each f i rm wo uld then repor t 
i t s  demand c urve for perm i t s , and the sum of the demand c urves would 
be u sed t o  cal culate the marke t-c learing price f or the fixed t o tal 
quant i ty of perm i t s  f or the ent ire market , Th i s  pr i ce would then be 
used to cal culate the f ina l a l l o cation of permi t s  t o  ea ch f i rm, 
a c cording t o  i t s  demand curv e .  Firms would make a gro s s  payment to 
the s tate eq ual t o  the market pri ce t imes thei r f inal a l location,  and 
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would r e c e iv e  a gro s s  r evenue from the s ta t e  equal to the marke t p r i c e  
t imes t h e  ini t i a l  al l o ca t i on .  The ne t f inancial e f f e c t  on each f irm 
would be the market price t im e s  the diff erence b e tween i t s  ini t i a l  and 
f ina l  al lo c a t i on ;  the ne t f inancial e f f e c t  on a l l  f irms taken together 
would b e  z er o . 
Ini t i a l izat ion methods that us e an auct ion pro c e s s  have two 
s ignif i cant a dvantag e s  over me tho d s  that s imp ly define the ini t i a l  
distr ibu t i on of perm i t s  a n d  then w ai t  for normal marke t f o r c e s  t o  
cause trade s .  The f ir s t  advantage i s  tha t  a l l  f i rms are placed o n  the 
s ame side of the marke t ini t i a l ly--a s  demande r s  f or s t a t e- i s s ued 
permit s .  Thi s  reduc e s  the likelihood tha t a l arge po l l ution sour c e  
w il l  be ab l e  t o  exer c i s e  marke t pow er , f o r  t h e  l a t t er depends on t h e  
share o f  f i rms '  exce s s  demand ( or s upp l y )  in r e l a tion t o  o ther s on the 
same side ot the marke t .  The se cond a dvantage i s  that a l l f irms 
par t i c ipat e in the e s tab l i shment of the auction pri c e ,  no t j us t  the 
f irms that are s uf f icient l y  out of equi l ibrium af ter the ini tial 
a l location of permi t s  tha t  they hav e  a s trong enough incen t ive t o  
or chestrate an e a r l y  tr ans a c t i on .  An auc t i on avoids t h e  trans a c t ion
co s t s  and o ther pro b l ems of b il a t eral neg o t ia tions for cons umma t ing 
the f ir s t  exchange s ,  and maximiz es the amount of inf ormat i on conv eyed 
by the ini t i a l  price signa l .  
The pr eceding d i s cus s ion o f  the s e  organizationa l i s s ue s  has 
value b eyond a par t i cular concern about market power in the context of 
th i s  case s t udy , Whil e  an imper f e c t l y  compe ti tive marke t f or perm i t s  
may not be a common prob l em, a l l  potent ial applica tions of tradab l e  
perm i t s  invo lve the s e l e c t i on of a n  ins t i tut ion f or al locat ing t h e  
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permi t s  in a manner that s a t i s f i e s  equi ty con s tr aint s and s t i l l  
promot e s  a n  e f f icient marke t .  Wher eas the na ture of the prob l ems t o  
be ov er c ome in f a c ing a trade-off between the s e  obje c t iv e s  w i l l  differ 
f rom case to case , conf l ic t s  be tween e f f i c i ency and the po l i tical 
perception of equi ty ar e l ike ly to be co!IDllo n .  The s ub s tantial 
dif f er ences i n  r egula tory st andards among indu s t r i e s  and be tween new 
and o l d  s o ur c e s  are manif e s ta tions of the s ame kind s of conf l i c t s  in 
the current s y s t em .  Thus , specif ica t i on of the proper ties o f  
diff er ent me thod s  f or d i s tributing permi t s  a n d  organiz ing trade s i s  a n  
impor t ant general i s s ue for making f ea s i b l e  t h e  adopt ion of tradab l e  
permi t s .  
GENERALIZ ING THE BAS I C  APPROACH 
Even if the forma t i on of a trada b l e  emi s s i ons perm i t  marke t i s  
f o und t o  b e  a n  a t tr a c t ive p o l i cy o p t i o n  f or o ne par t i cular po l l utant 
in a specif ic l o ca l e ,  the i s s ue s t i l l remains a s  t o  the 
general izab i l i ty of the r e s ul t .  Wi l l  a de t a i l e d  air qua l i ty mod e l  
a lway s  be r eq ui r ed f o r  each app l i c a tion? W i l l  n ew  co s t  e s t imat e s  need 
to be dev e l o ped f or each c a s e ?  In shor t ,  w i l l  regulator s  n e e d  to 
under take an in-depth ana l y s i s  s im i l ar to the one d i s c u s s e d  her e in 
order t o  a s certain whe ther a marke t s o l ution i s  appropria t e  for a 
par ticul ar prob l em? 
Certainly , some ana l y s i s  w i l l a lway s be r equired in th inking 
about making the tran s i tion from " c ommand and contr o l "  regulation to a 
marke t approach ; howev er , it is l ike ly tha t  as experience w ith 
incent ive-based o p tions s uch as marke t s  increa se s ,  the l ev e l  of 
43 
ana ly s i s  needed for po t ent ial new app l i ca t ions w i l l  decrea s e . 
S pe c i f ica l ly ,  what are the c r i t i c a l  component s w i th which a 
regulator should concern him s e l f  before considering a marke t s cheme ? 
One i s  the approximate co s t s  of r eg u l a t i on incur r ed by the agency and 
by indu s t r y .  A second would be the agency' s mo nit o ring and 
enforcement capab i l i ty . A third impor tant e l ement would be know l edge 
about the s o ur c e s  of emi s s ion s , and a fourth wo uld b e  an under s tanding 
of the r e l a t i onship between sour c e  emi s s ions and mea sur e s  of 
environment a l  q ual i t y .  
The f ir s t  po int to o b s e rv e  about t h i s  l i s t  of req uiremen t s  i s  
tha t in a genera l  w ay i t  i s  COIIDllOn t o  the d ev e l o pment o f  a r a t io nal 
env ironmental po l icy of any kind . A regulator ne eds to hav e  some idea 
of the r e l a tionship b e tween emi s s ion s and p o l l ution in order t o  
develop a s e t  of s t andard s , tradab l e  em i s sions perm it s , or eff luent 
taxe s that accomp l i she s the obj e c t iv e s  of env ironmental po l i c y .  
Moreover , regulator s need t o  know the pre-regulat ion pa t t ern o f  
emi s s ions a n d  t h e  aba t ement oppor t uni t i e s  ava i lab l e  t o  each maj or 
sour c e  in order to s e t  s t andards or taxe s that w i l l achieve 
enviromnental obj e c t iv e s  in a co s t- ef f e c t iv e  manner .  F i na l ly ,  a l l  
po l ic i e s  mus t be cons i s t ent w i th the ab i l i ty o f  the r egul ator t o  
moni t or emi s s ions and po l l ution,  and t o  enf orce any me tho d of 
ach i ev ing its goa l . 
Nev er th e l es s , the inf ormat i ona l requirement s may dif fer in 
their detail s f or impl ement ing a sy s t em  of tradab l e  p e rmi t s .  One 
r ea son is that a po s i t iv e  c a s e  ne eds to be made to conv ince po l i t i c a l  
a c t or s--regulator s ,  regulated busine s se s , environment a l i s t s ,  a n d  the 
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pub l i c  a t  l ar g e-- tha t a chang e in regulatory me tho d s  is wor th trying . 
Thi s  i s  the sour c e  of the b e l ief that th e ini tial imp l ementat ion of a 
tradab l e  permi t s  sy s t em w i l l  r equire a w e l l-do c umented s t udy of i t s  
l ike ly perf ormance , but that s ubsequent imp l ementa t i on s  wil l requi r e  
l e s s  inf o rma tion if t h e  ini t i a l  program s u c c eed s . 
Even so , a marke t approa ch may s t i l l requi r e  a d i f f er ent 
combination of ana ly s i s  and data than o ther approache s .  The reason i s  
that the impor t ant r egulatory de c i s ions in imp l em enting and 
maintaining a marke t s y s t em are s omewhat d i f f er ent , l eading to 
dif f er ent ev ident iary requiremen t s  if a r egulatory author i ty ' s 
de c i s ions are to w i th s tand legal and po l i t i cal a t tacks . A ca s e  in 
po int would be the e s t ab l i shment of a ba s e l ine emi s s ions inventory 
upon whi ch t o  make the ini t i a l  d i s tribution of permi t s .  B e caus e 
po t ent ial ly large imp l i c i t  weal th trans f er s  are involved , par t i c i pant s 
in the pro ce s s  to set up a tradab l e  permi t s  sy s t em could be expec t e d  
t o  take an a c t iv e  interest in e s t ab l i sh ing a b a s e l ine , l eading a n  
agency t o  make a greater cOIIDlli tment of r e sour c e s  t o  thi s i s s ue than 
woul d o therw ise be the c a s e . By the same toke n ,  agency expendi tur e s  
f o r  ident ifying be s t  contr o l  te chnologies could b e  reduced , because 
the agency wou l d  no l onger ne ed t o  e s t ab l i sh l ega l ly def en s i b l e  
sour c e- s p e c i f i c  s tandar d s . In a world wi th tradab l e  permi t s ,  the key 
r egulatory d e c i s ions are the ini tial al location o f  the permi t s , the 
e s tab l i shment of t o t a l  emi s s ions l imi t s ,  and the determina tion of an 
amb i ent air q ual ity s t andard . Regulatory resour c e s  would t end t o  b e  
redire c ted t oward s  the s e  i s s ue s ,  a n d  away from s tudying prob l ems o f  
specif ic source s .  
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As a pra c t i cal ma t t e r ,  a marke t approach i s  l ike ly to r e t ain 
some s tandard s . In the case r e po r t e d  her e ,  for examp l e ,  a t t ent i on was 
focused ent ir e ly o n  the effect of S Ox emi s s ions on par t i culate
sulfates because the Los Ang e l e s  a i r shed i s  in comp l iance w i th 
s tandard s  for s o2 concentra tion s . As d i s c u s s e d  abov e ,  s o2 emi s s ions 
undergo chemical react ions and transpo r t a t i on in the a tmos phere t o  
become s ul f a te s .  Thus , a t  a ny g iven l o c a t i o n ,  s o2 p o l l ution i s  more 
l ike ly to be the resul t of a nearby sour c e  of so2 emi s s i on s , whereas 
par t i culate s ul f a t e s  ar e mor e l ike ly t o  be the result of emi s s ions 
from numerous s o ur ce s , inc l uding some a t  a r e l a t ively great d i s t ance . 
In Lo s Ang e le s ,  compl ian c e  w i t h  s o2 s t andards genera l ly only r eq ui r e s  
t h a t  maj or em i s s i ons s o ur c e s  insta l l  t a l l enough smoke s ta cks so that 
by the t ime s o2 reache s the ground it has been adequa t e ly dis per sed in
the a tmo s phere t o  s a t i s f y  maximum atmo s pher i c  concentr a t i on s . The 
adoption of an emi s s ion s marke t f or s ul f ur in Lo s Ang e l e s  a s  a means 
f or contro l l ing s u l f a t e  po l lut i on would mo s t  a s suredly be done in the 
context of a continue d  r equirement of an adequa t e  stack height f or 
maj or s t a t i onary sour c e s  of so2 emi s s i on s . Thi s  ob serva t i on has qui te 
g ener al appl i cab i l i t y ,  for i t  i s  commo n ly the ca se tha t a s ing l e  
s o ur c e  o f  emi s s ions produces several dif f er ent kinds of po l lution : a 
nearby eff e c t  for whi ch i t  i s  the o n ly sour c e ,  and mor e d i s tant 
e f f e c t s  that involve int er a c t i on s  w i th o ther source s .  Marke t s  are 
well s ui ted f or deal ing w i th the latter ca s e ,  but only wi thin the 
cont ext of maximum perm i s s i b l e  concentrat ions at the po int of 
emi s s ions in order to avo i d  exceeding the l imi t s  for l o c a l iz e d  
effec t s . A t  t h e  extr eme , for case s in which l o ca l i z ed e f f e c t s  a r e  the 
binding cons traint on emi s sions for mo s t  of the impor tant source s ,  a 
trada b l e  perm i t s  s y s t em could have l imited value . 
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Ano ther s i t ua tion in whi ch tradab l e  permi t s  may be l e s s  
attrac t iv e  i s  in t h e  c a s e  o f  very comp l ex pol lut ion prob lems i n  which 
s everal typ e s  of emi s s ion s interac t  t o  form a var i e ty of po l l utant s ,  
of ten in nonl inear and even nonmono t oni c way s .  An examp l e  o f  a 
comp l e x ,  nonmonotoni c  po l l ution pro b l em i s  pho t o chemical smog . Smog 
i s  the produc t of chemical react i on s  involving , among o ther thing s , 
numerous hydro carbon c ompo und s  and oxide s of ni trogen ( NOx ) , For
d i f f er ent combina tions of emis s i on s  in the a tmos pher e ,  smog can be 
ei ther incr ea sed or decreased by incr ea s ing emi s s ions of NOx • Mor e 
gener a l ly ,  the specif ic kinds and geograph i c  d i s t r ibution of numerous 
emi s s ions can be very impor tant in determining the severity of 
po l lution , g iv en a constant l ev e l  of total emi s s ions f or NOx and
hydro c arbons . Wh i l e  thi s may be succe s sful ly a t tacked by a set of 
marke t s  for several categor i e s  of emi s s i on s , perhaps w i th considerabl e 
geographi c f ine t uning , i t  i s  a l s o  po s s ibl e tha t a p ur e  market 
s o l ut i on w i l l no t be prac t i ca l . Inde ed ,  regu l ator s could wel l f ind 
tha t they mus t re tain a r eq uir ement of prior approval of maj or 
tr ans a c t ions of perm i t s  f or smog component s i n  order to prov ide the 
opportuni ty t o  inv e s tigate their con s eq uence s f or air qual i t y .  
Never thel e s s , al though t h e  pro b l em  of de termining t h e  feasibi l i ty o f  
tradab le permi t s  f or deal ing wi th smog i s  far mor e diff i cul t than the 
Sox f ea s i bi l i ty prob l em ,  the method of th i s  paper i s  s t i l l  app l icab l e ,
wi th the answer depending o n  empirical i s s ue s  r e l a t ing t o  the de t a i l s 
of the emi s s ions / ai r  q ua l i ty r e l a tionship and the aba t ement co s t  
f un c t i ons of emi s s i ons source s . 
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With the preceding cavea t s  i n  m ind , the research to da t e  on 
the Lo s Ang e l e s  sulfate prob l em ind i c a t e s  tha t tradab l e  emi s s ions 
perm i t s  are a promising a l terna t iv e  t o  command and control regulation.  
For the ca se of par t iculate s u l f a t e s  in Lo s Ang e le s ,  none of the maj o r  
sour c e s  of marke t imper f e c t ions appear to be so intractab l e  that they 
canno t be ov er c ome by an int e l l igent ly d e signed marke t in s t i t ution . 
Hence , because of the o ther bene f i c i a l  incentive e f f e c t s  of the 
sys tem ,  tradab l e  permi t s  f or s u l f ur oxides emi s s ions in Lo s Ang e l e s  
appear attractiv e .  Moreov er , t h e  ana l y t i c a l  i s s ue s  a s s o ciated w ith 
r e s earching the q ue s tion of the f ea s i b i l i ty of a permi t s  marke t hav e  
a l so prov ed t o  be trac tab l e ,  s ugg e s t ing t h a t  t h e  same methods migh t b e  
fruitful ly app l ie d  t o  o ther po l l ution pro b l ems . 
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